Introduction
The mediatization of politics has attracted increasing scholarly attention in recent years. The central research question is how and to what extent the media change politics. In answering this question, theoretical accounts are now tested more and more empirically, with studies on changes of various political aspects, such as parliamentary activity (Kepplinger, 2002) , political agenda setting (e. g., Walgrave, 2008) , political hierarchy (Daremas and Terzis, 2000) , election rhetoric (Håkansson, 1997) , and voter behavior (Schulz, Zeh, and Quiring, 2005) .
Still, three critical remarks can be made. First, the strong bias toward news (coverage) (e. g., Kepplinger, 2002; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009) overshadows the importance of other media formats, especially entertainment, in the changing nature and performance of politics (van Zoo-nen, 2005) . The notions of politainment (Dörner, 2001 ) and celebrity politics (West and Orman, 2003) , which point to the merging of entertainment (media) and politics, make this argument even stronger. Second, specific attention has been paid to elections and campaigns (e. g., Brants and Van Praag, 2006; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Schulz, et al., 2005) , while everyday politics has been somewhat neglected, although they clearly differ (cf. Van Aelst and De Swert, 2009, p. 150) . Third, in operationalizing the complex metaprocess of mediatization (Krotz, 2009 ), a number of scholars have adhered to the functionalist notions of media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979) and, in the case of politics, political or party logic (e. g., Meyer, 2002; Strömbäck, 2008 ). Yet, several authors have criticized the concept of media logic for being singular (Lundby, 2009b) and linear (Couldry, 2008; Hepp, 2009) .
In this article, we start by analyzing the different views on media in mediatization studies, which leads us to the question of how practice theory (Couldry, 2004; Schatzki, 1996) can be a relevant alternative for the study of mediatization. We argue that mediatization should not be analyzed through logic but by looking at how people's practices (do not) engage with media (e. g., McCurdy, 2008) . However, since practice theory has been developed mainly on the theoretical level, our empirical study is exploratory and only a starting point for further research. We focus on politicians' media-related practices as party members and as individual politicians to get a better understanding of personalization, which is an important manifestation of the mediatization of politics (see Mazzoleni, 2000; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007) . Briefly stated, one of the changes induced by the mediation of politics is an increasing prominence of individual politicians and their personal and private details. Through in-depth interviews with fourteen Flemish 1 politicians and two spokesmen of politicians, we explore how media may anchor or organize politicians' practices and what practices politicians perform in direct and indirect relation to the media Ϫ both news and entertainment media, in electoral as well as in everyday politics.
Mediatization in media-saturated societies
Mediatization studies contain a rich diversity in the conceptualization and operationalization of media's influence and role in society and culture (see Hjarvard, 2008; Lundby, 2009a) . On the level of scholarly contexts, this is being reflected in the use of different, but related terms (Livingstone, 2009) , such as mediazation (Thompson, 1995) , mediation (e. g., Couldry, 2008; Silverstone, 2005) , and mediatization (e. g., Kepplinger, 2002; Schulz, 2004) , to name a few. Here, mediation is understood as "communication via a medium, the intervention of which can affect both the message and the relationship between sender and receiver" (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 114) . Through its stress on transmission, this concept is more "neutral" than mediatization (Strömbäck and Esser, 2009, p. 207) , which occurs when mediated communication affects one or more aspects or levels of society and culture. Winfried Schulz (2004, pp. 88Ϫ90 ) discerned four interrelated processes of social change involving the media: (1) extension, as media and communication technologies enable people to conquer limits of time and space; (2) substitution, as media "partly or completely substitute social activities and social institutions and thus change their character" (Schulz, 2004, p. 89) , for example videoconferencing instead of meetings in a shared room; (3) amalgamation, which points to the merging of media(ted) and non-media(ted) activities, with media pervading ever more aspects of our lives and society; (4) accommodation, which means that because of media's existence and increasing importance, this already engenders social changes since organizations or individuals have to reckon with the media and possibly have to adapt to them. Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser (2009, p. 211) add a fifth process, creation, as media also bring about media events, events organized with the aim of attaining media coverage.
The conceptualization of mediatization through these five processes clearly fits the cultural and societal perspective on communication (cf. Krotz, 2009, pp. 28Ϫ29) . In this perspective communication "is an important element of the set of practices by which human beings construct their environment and themselves; their social relations and their everyday lives; their identities; and the social phenomena, sense, and meaning" (Krotz, 2009, p. 29) . In other words, media are not seen as merely an intervening variable, which is more the case in the behavioristic or functional perspective. Communication is understood here as the transmission of information, which is supported by media technologies that facilitate the storage or delivery of a message, for example. This implies that communication is separated from society and culture, a view Friedrich Krotz recognizes in the study of Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz (1999) .
We can draw parallel conclusions when we look not at communication, but at media and their degree of pervasiveness in society and culture. In sidestepping the behaviorist model in favor of a cultural model, David Altheide and Robert Snow (1979) coined the term media logic to explain the increasing media influence in different societal institutions. By arguing that media influence should be conceived as an interactional process in which several institutions operate according to media logic, they implicitly situate the media as (originally) separated from other institutions. Stig Hjarvard (2008, p. 113) , who adopts the media logic concept, subscribes this view of media as an independent institution in society, but, interestingly, at the same time stresses the integration of the media into other social institutions. Yet a number of authors (e. g., Friesen and Hug, 2009; Ostertag, 2008; Silverstone, 2005) push the pervasiveness of media (technologies) further and argue that they have become inseparable and highly integrated in society and culture. Norm Friesen and Theo Hug (2009, p. 64) , for example, posit that "it hardly bears repeating that in today's world, media, in their different forms, have thoroughly interpenetrated everyday life and knowledge, making even the most banal tasks all but unimaginable without these forms and technologies." Or, in the case of politics: "Politics, like experience, can no longer even be thought outside a media frame" (Silverstone, 2005, p. 190) . Consequently, we are living in media-saturated societies (Lundby, 2009a, p. 2) or in what Roger Silverstone (2007) calls a "mediapolis."
This, we want to argue, urges us to focus more on practices rather than logics if we want to grasp media's role and the process of mediatization in media-saturated environments. This is in fact not completely new as many mediatization scholars make reference to the study of practices. For example, Sonia Livingstone (2009, p. 4) refers to the Germanic and Scandinavian definition of mediatization as "the metaprocess by which everyday practices and social relations are increasingly shaped by mediating technologies and media organization." Krotz (2009, p. 27 ; italics in original) asserts that "mediatization theory is not so much interested in the single media technology but in the communicational practices associated with the media." What is different in our approach, however, is that we make use of the rich literature on practice theory to study the vast range of people's doings and sayings in direct or indirect relation to media. The advantage of this is that it "opens the door for media scholars to consider how people live and breathe media in their talk and action," says Stephen Ostertag (2008, p. 25) , which "vastly expands where media scholars focus their investigations and it places media studies in the larger field of social theory because (…) it recognizes and celebrates the infinite ways in which media inform our everyday lives."
Practice theory
Practice theory has its roots in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hubert Dreyfus, and Charles Taylor, and in social theory, among others the praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, and the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (see Postill, forthcoming; Reckwitz, 2002, pp. 243Ϫ244; Schatzki, 2001, pp. 1Ϫ2) . Karl Marx can be added as a forerunner of practice theory as he stressed the importance of practices in his eight thesis on Feuerbach: "All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries which lead theory towards mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice" (Bottomore and Rubel, 1965, p. 84) . Because of this scattered input, practice theory's identity is not yet well-established, although Theodore Schatzki (1996 Schatzki ( , 2001 and Andreas Reckwitz (2002) have made significant contributions in this respect.
Generally, practice theory situates the social not in discourse, or in the mind, or in interaction, but, obviously, in practices. A practice is "a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, "things" and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge" (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249) . It is in social practices that "social life" or "society" is continuously being produced, reproduced or transformed. It is also within social practices that people construct their social identities. Of course, the development of those practices is largely influenced by the material, social, cultural and symbolic resources people have at their disposal. Those resources are distributed unequally, which gives cause to a variety of social practices. Schatzki (1996, pp. 91Ϫ110) distinguished between dispersed and integrative practices. Integrative practices are constitutive of a social field and are complex. For example, through several interconnected embodied and material practices such as reporting in the field or producing news broadcasts in the studio, the journalistic field is constituted. Integrative practices integrate several dispersed practices (or what Todd May (2001, p. 19 ) prefers to call skills or abilities), which occur in different social fields, for example, debating, ordering, and describing. These kinds of practices can be different according to the field in which they are performed. The practice of debating, for instance, can vary depending on whether it is performed in the legal, political, or educational field.
While it is not yet clear how media-related practices are organized internally and relationally, it is interesting to use them as a starting point, "since it distances us from the normal media studies assumption that what audiences do ("audiencing") is a distinctive set of practices rather than an artificially chosen "slice" through daily life that cuts across how they actually understand the practices in which they are engaged" (Couldry, 2004, p. 121; italics in original) . In other words, practice theory opens up a new way of studying media by sidestepping media studies' ample attention for texts Ϫ how are media products (narratively) structured, how are they interpreted, etc. Ϫ as well as institutional production structures (cf. political economy) (Couldry, 2004, pp. 117Ϫ120) .
Four additional arguments can be put forward to illustrate the relevance of practice theory for mediatization studies. First, there is a twosided relation between social practices and media. On the one hand, the way people deal with the media is largely dependent on which social practice it is integrated into (amalgamation). For instance, different viewers can integrate the same news broadcast into different social practices. For one viewer a broadcast with breaking news can be part of his social practice of being informed as good as possible. For another viewer the same broadcast can be integrated into a very different social practice, that of participating in a community by seeing the event as it unfolds (as a kind of ritual viewing). On the other hand, the way people develop their social practices is partly dependent on the way those social practices are represented in the media. There are not only different social practices; there are also different discourses about those practices. In other words, the resulting mediatization of those practices is becoming more and more important.
Second, a key characteristic of social practices is their degree of visibility. Some social practices have a public, frontstage character, whereas other social practices have a private, backstage character. Historically, the media have always played a significant role in making some social practices more public while keeping others private. Yet, the Internet has intensified this tendency. The ever expanding amount of "user-generated content" essentially turns then private social practices into frontstage, public practices. John Postill offers a good example of this in referring to BASE jumping, the illegal practice of parachute jumping from skyscrapers or bridges:
Thus growing numbers of BASE jumpers now fit small video cameras onto their helmets and/or bodies to become "stars of their own inflight movies" which they later replay and share with others. (…) What in the BASE scene is customarily regarded as an ephemeral, private and ineffable practice Ϫ the jump Ϫ is transformed by means of new media technologies into an enduring, public and visible practice (Postill, forthcoming).
Third, not only the expanding mediatization of our society, but also the transformation of politics is important for the way social practices are carried out by people. Following "emancipatory politics'" successes, different aspects of "life politics" (Giddens, 1991, p. 215 ) have come to influence the social practices of people. Citizens have to take more and more important life decisions on their own, which renders social life more complex. Because of this, some people increasingly look at the media to get a kind of orientation Ϫ which may also offer a partial explanation for their relation with celebrities. Fourth, social practices are not isolated from each other. On the contrary, what gives practices their social character is exactly the fact that most practices are interrelated. Some practices anchor, control, or dominate others (for example, through definitional hierarchy or public rituals) (Swidler, 2001) . Nick Couldry (2003 Couldry ( , 2004 suggested that media can perform this anchoring through their symbolic power in different social fields. Consequently, the central question of the mediatization of politics can be reformulated from "how and to what extent politics is changed by and through media" to "how and to what extent media anchor, control, and/or organize political practices." This permits alternative ways of understanding the role played by media through examination of the open-ended range of practices related to media. These vary from the way media influence the timing and staging of political events, or how politicians perform front-stage behavior as a private or public persona, to how they might try to avoid the media. Indeed, practices of (un)intentionally avoiding or ignoring the media are relevant as well (Couldry, 2004, p. 120) , which exemplifies practice theory's ability to evade media centralism.
Personalization
In this article, we focus on the open-ended range of practices carried out by politicians that are organized, anchored, and/or controlled by and through media. However, since the multitude of possible practices performed by politicians falls beyond the scope of one article, focusing on one or more particular practices or on a thematic grouping, is necessary. Therefore, we delve into one specific aspect that is often mentioned in the literature on the mediatization of politics, personalization (e. g., Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck, 2008) .
Overall, scholars describe personalization as a product of the mutual influencing of media and politics, although there are different views on the outline of this process. Some argue that politicians adopt the media's storytelling technique of personalization and import this in their construction of political events, such as campaigns. In this way, personalities gain an increasingly important status in political culture, which is then also reflected in more personalized news reporting (see Schulz, et al., 2005, p. 59; Strömbäck, 2008, p. 238) . Stated differently, politics adapts to the "media logic." Gideon Rahat and Tamir Sheafer (2007) challenged this view by considering three different types of personalization: institutional, media, and behavioral (political) personalization. Contrary to other scholars, Rahat and Sheafer conceived of personalization not as a process of media-politics-media (see above) but of politics-media-politics: institutional personalization (e. g., political reforms of the electoral system in favor of individual politicians) results in media personalization (representation), which subsequently increases politicians' behavioral personalization (decline in party activity). However, although it would be more fruitful to present personalization as a non-linear process, in which the multidirectional interaction between media and politics would be recognized, Rahat and Sheafer's typology of personalization offers a good starting point for operationalization.
A more elaborate overview of the different types of personalization is given by Rosa van Santen and Liesbet van Zoonen (2009, pp. 167Ϫ169) , as they discerned seven types of personalization:
(1) institutional personalization: institutional changes that prioritize individual politicians (cf. presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005)), (2) focus on (top) politicians: persons gain media attention at the expense of parties, (3) party leaders as embodiments of the party: the leader is pushed forward as the figurehead of the party by politicians and/or parties, (4) individual political competence: individual professional qualities are increasingly scrutinized by the media, (5) personal narratives: the personal background and emotions of individual politicians are brought into the limelight by the media, (6) privatization: the private lives of politicians come at the forefront in the media, (7) behavioral personalization: a tendency towards a decrease of party activity in favor of individual political behavior.
This article cannot examine all seven types of personalization thoroughly. Moreover, practice theory would not offer added value in explaining every type. For example, the second type (focus on top politicians) can be examined accurately through longitudinal quantitative content analysis of media output, whereas practice theory cannot easily demonstrate significant changes in this respect.
Method and data
Several authors (Kepplinger, 2002; Rothenbuhler, 2009; Schrott, 2009 ) have contended that mediatization should be studied through longitudinal and comparative research. This implies a large dependency on textual sources (archives, reports, news articles, or broadcasts) to diagnose historical changes or "effects" produced by media. Examples of this can be easily found in the literature on the personalization of politics as well (e. g., Kaase, 1994; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; Reinemann and Wilke, 2007) . However, there is also another side to this process: "Almost as rare as studies on organizational consequences are studies that focus on the effects of the mediatization of the political system for individuals in the role of voters, citizens, or individuals involved in policy making" (Schrott, 2009, p. 45) . While Schulz et al. (2005) studied voters, we focus on the latter category, politicians. More specifically, we want to gain a deeper insight into the process of personalization by exploring politicians' practices Ϫ or their "doings and sayings" (Schatzki, 1996) Ϫ with specific attention to their relation to media and media's (lack of) influence on politicians' practices. Our study is based on in-depth interviews with Flemish politicians. While our reliance on interviews ("discourses") may seem contradictory to a practice theoretical stance ("practices") at first sight, it suffices to note that ideas or sayings (discursive practices) are always embodied, and even the simplest activities (non-discursive practices) are not thoughtless. Performing a practice always involves knowing and acting at once (cf. Wenger, 1999, pp. 47Ϫ48). Our sample includes 16 Flemish politicians (of whom two interviews were conducted with their spokesmen) and contains diversity in terms of place of residence, age (from 29 to 57, mean 47.69), gender (4 females and 12 males), political function, and party affiliation. Concerning political function, the sample includes toplevel politicians Ϫ a former prime minister, four former and three current party chairmen, a chairman of Parliament, and an incumbent minister, all at the time of the interviews (AprilϪMay 2009) Ϫ as well as lower-profile politicians (senators and members of Parliament who can be described as backbenchers and ex-ministers who have turned more to the background). Concerning party affiliation, all eight major political parties 2 are represented in the sample, including two politicians of the extreme right-wing party Vlaams Belang. This is the reincarnation of Vlaams Blok, whose three core groups were convicted of racism and xenophobia in 2004 (cf. Brems, 2006) . Still, in the last regional elections (June 2009), this party ended up as the second biggest with 15.3 % of the votes and 21 seats in the Flemish Parliament.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face and using a semi-structured questionnaire. Interview topics varied from personalization (with questions on media coverage and representation, the proportion of personal versus party coverage, privatization, personal narratives, etc.) to the politicians' relationship with infotainment media and the differences with quality news media, and their self-presentational management. Due to the tight schedule of the politicians, especially because of the near elections, not all interviews lasted equally long, with some a little less than 30 minutes (on average about 40 minutes). The transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed in NVivo through thematic coding, combining deductive coding (van Santen and van Zoonen's (2009) personalization typology) and inductive coding (themes emerging from respondents' statements). Where possible, we triangulated the data with the media output on the respective politicians. In two cases, a discrepancy was found between these sources. The first case displays different versions on a privacy matter, while the second shows a divergence on whether the politician took the initiative for an interview.
Personalization according to politicians
Our data clearly demonstrate the ambiguity or even ambivalence of the mediatization process that Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999, pp. 251Ϫ252) hinted at. On the one hand, politicians can be seen to perform practices to adapt to the increasing mediation and mediatization of politics ("selfmediatization" (Meyer, 2002, p. 58) ). On the other hand, in this adaptation, politicians carry out practices that are aimed at retaining or regaining control at the same time. Examples of this are participating in entertainment programs, blogging, and image-building, with the intention to manage one's image, representation and privacy.
Image-building
Image is something that is constituted by and constituting media-related practices. For example, a number of respondents tried to assemble the image of a hard-working, serious politician Ϫ "briefcase politician" (Meyer, 2002, p. 78 ) Ϫ through arrays of activities that are core to the political field (integrative practices), limiting practices related to the popular and the private to a minimum. This, in turn, is productive for the politicians' future media-related practices, as the media are expected to take them more serious as well. However, as some respondents attested, a common strategy in building the image of a briefcase politician is to ask many parliamentary questions to get media attention (cf. Kepplinger, 2002 ) and a good mark on political journalists' score sheets at the end of the term (behavioral personalization). This anchoring of political practices by the media (or accommodation) has taken on such proportions though, that the president of the Flemish Parliament, Jan Peumans (N-VA), launched the idea of limiting the number of questions in commissions and the plenary assembly to improve the debate (Winckelmans, 2010) Ϫ and to counteract the mediatization of politics.
Still, our data show that building the image of a briefcase politician is not that easy for every kind of politician, as this female president of a political party suggested:
I am someone who performs politics in a serious and sincere way, but then they think rather quickly: "oh well, she's a bitch" or something. Because of that, you have to participate in soft media programs to prove that this is not the case, in a manner of speaking. I participate in every entertainment program if it doesn't affect the dignity of my person. But I will never say something about my private life. That, I think, is a dangerous evolution.
(female, 34)
This quotation is interesting in many ways. First, it demonstrates that the practices of certain front benchers are (obviously) more anchored by the media than those of less prominent politicians. Second, this quotation exemplifies gender differences of personalization (van Zoonen, 2006) but is a counterexample to the conclusion that the importance of style and physical appearance has urged (certain) female politicians to develop a predominantly professional and political public persona. Third, the respondent made a distinction between entertainment programs and private issues. This makes clear that we should not think of personalization only in terms of the private versus the public or the political but should also consider the popular as an inherent aspect (cf. Corner, 2000) .
The popular
Although somewhat missing in the typology of personalization we discussed above, the popular (self) seems to be an important facet. Some politicians seem to participate in infotainment and entertainment programs (Brants and Neijens, 1998 ) not to disclose their private lives but to present a humorous, fun, and "ordinary" persona. For this process, we can borrow the term "humanization" (Holtz-Bacha, 2004, p. 48) here not as a function of privatization but as a type of personalization. In Flanders, the entertainment program that tops the list of many (interviewed) politicians is the very popular television quiz De Slimste Mens. People believe that N-VA was one of the big victors in the last regional elections (2009) This success has strongly reinforced the idea of the necessity of performing these kinds of "popular practices" with politicians. In the competition for attention, they want to fight on even terms and they accommodate to other politicians' practices Ϫ or, in other words, the media-related practices of some politicians organize those of other politicians.
Notable exceptions to this are the politicians of Vlaams Belang. In the '90s, when Vlaams Blok was growing rapidly, all other parties agreed not to cooperate with this party. This formal agreement, which was called the cordon sanitaire, was also applied in the media (as cordon mediatique), to minimize the party's media presence, unless politically relevant. Therefore, the party has been almost completely invisible in popular media formats, although some party politicians have succeeded in attracting attention through privacy disclosure. Since the transformation of Vlaams Blok into Vlaams Belang (see above), the formal agreements have expired, but, interestingly, are maintained informally through politicians' and media professionals' embodied practices. As one Vlaams Belang member of Parliament said:
It is not done to treat a member of Vlaams Belang as a person, as a human being or so. However, we could say we now have a little breakthrough with the illness of Marie-Rose Morel, whom is covered in Dag Allemaal, but that is an exception on the general rule that we only appear in political programs and that our political message cannot be too personalized.
(male, 51)
Still, just like other respondents, he would not accept every offer if he were invited. An important criterion in this respect is whether the program affects the politician's dignity as a person. For example, a number of respondents refuse to go on quiz programs due to a lack of sufficient general knowledge, while others are afraid of being ridiculed. Therefore, many respondents participate only when the program or interview allows them to insert a (minimal) political message.
The private
The same rule applies when it comes to the private lives of some politicians (privatization) (cf. van Zoonen, et al., 2007) . They expose private details only when it is politically relevant (e. g., absence through illness or pregnancy) Ϫ or when something is impossible to hide from the media (the extreme weight loss of one respondent). Most respondents, however, are reluctant to disclose their private lives: their families have not chosen public lives, doing so has no (political) relevance, or leads to uncontrollable situations and a downward privacy spiral. What and how much are disclosed (or, to what extent the media control or organize private consumption practices, for example) depend on the politicians' personal definition of private life and its relevancy for politics (or the political anchoring of private practices). The 29-year-old female respondent, for instance, argued that her consumption practices are private and have no political relevancy, whereas a 57-year-old male member of Parliament thought the opposite. As a Social-Democrat, he said, it would not be appropriate to drive a really expensive and polluting car. For the former, political practices are located in the Parliament and official buildings, whereas for the latter, these practices are not bound to specific places. The importance of places Ϫ or "stations" (Postill, forthcoming) Ϫ is also illustrated by a former minister's (57, male) organization of interviewing practices. To control his privacy, he gives interviews only in the Senate or in his lawyer's office, and no longer at his home, because each time it resulted in a privacy breach. The boundary between the public and the private is continuously reproduced by politicians' and journalists' practices, which are, as we have seen, routinized and partly built with tacit knowledge (implicit relations, unspoken rules, underlying assumptions, shared worldviews, etc.). In this way, we can understand a boundary as a "negotiation of meaning" or "a process that is shaped by multiple elements and that affects these elements," which "constantly changes the situations to which it gives meaning and affects all participants" (Wenger, 1999, p. 54) . This explains the fierce reactions when journalists' or politicians' practices breach individual or collective boundaries. "When a colleague has gone too far, he also gets comments on it," said a 55-year-old female respondent in this respect.
Finally, another practice for retaining control over media (coverage) and one's image is to maintain a blog. This allows some interviewed politicians to bypass news gatekeepers and get attention. Others do not need this behavioral personalization, however, as they are much solicited and have the luxury of selecting which invitations to accept. One politician, a then former prime minister, even stated that his team performed practices of media attention-avoidance: "The most important task of my spokesman is to keep me out of the media" (male, 49). Obviously, this is an exception, and we have to take it with a grain of salt given his wide array of public and media performances.
Conclusion
In this article, we tried to offer an alternative framework for the theoretical analysis and empirical study of mediatization. This is necessary, we think, because the evolution towards media-saturated societies invites researchers to use other concepts and tools to adequately grasp the social and cultural changes in relation to media. Instead of relying exclusively on the media logic concept or on texts through longitudinal (and in some cases comparative) studies, we propose that it is also useful to study people's practices. Practice theory has been developed mainly in philosophy (Schatzki, 1996) and sociology (Reckwitz, 2002) but is gaining increasing attention within media studies (cf. Couldry, 2004; McCurdy, 2008; Postill, forthcoming) . Studying the media not as texts or as production structures broadens our perspective and draws our attention to practices related to the media (including the avoidance of media) and their role in anchoring or organizing other practices. This makes practice theory particularly relevant for mediatization research.
However, Kurt Lewin's (1952, p. 169 ) famous adage, "There is nothing more practical than a good theory," has not yet been verified for practice theory. Although our aim has been primarily to illustrate the practice theoretical analysis of mediatization, this empirical study should be considered as a small, yet important, first step. More concretely, through indepth interviews we explored politicians' media-related practices to gain insight into the process of personalization, which is a manifestation of mediatization. Our results show that, contrary to some (popular) beliefs, the media are not a juggernaut rolling over politics, producing a linear and unstoppable mediatization. In fact, our findings draw a complex picture of the mediatization and personalization of politics. First, there are many signs and examples that do confirm to some extent that politics is becoming more personalized and mediatized (e. g., asking many parliamentary questions to get media attention, and participating in entertainment shows). However, it has also been made clear that in many ways and on many occasions, these media(-related) practices can at the same time be aimed at controlling the impact and influence of the media on the politicians' own functioning and on politics as such. Practices related to image-building and constituting the boundary between the public and the private are examples of this. Thirdly, politicians' media-related practices are also influenced by other politicians' media-related practices. For example, a number of politicians feel obliged to accept invitations for talk shows and more popular programs not immediately because of the media, but because their colleagues do as well. Related is our conclusion that in studying personalization we should pay attention not only to the private but also to the popular, which is in various ways addressed to get media attention and to shape one's image.
Due to the focus on personalization, media have been generally understood here as mass media, especially television and newspapers. However, it is worthwhile to broaden the scope for changes induced by other communication technologies such as mobile phones or the Internet. For instance, mobile phones have certainly changed practices and relationships between journalists and politicians. Politicians have become more available for journalists, both in time and space, but also inversely, jour-nalists have become much easier to consult with, and the possibilities for strategically leaking information have increased. To conclude, by looking at practices related to media and not at single media technologies, practice theory can offer many new possibilities for mediatization research.
